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Commercial Paper and Business Cycles
Cyclical movements of commercial paper have many aspects, such as
the behavior of maturities, identity of borrowers and lenders at different
cycle phases, and the behavior of outstanding paper. However, the
discussion will focus on the last and will consist largely of an analysis of
the Federal Reserve monthly series for the period 1953-61. I shall first
describe the behavior of outstandings during business cycles and then
undertake an explanation of this behavior.
Behavior of Monthly Outstandings
The lower line in Chart 13 is the Federal Reserve series for total com-
mercial paper outstanding, adjusted fGr seasonal variations. Cyclical
movements, corresponding to the three recessions and two complete
expansions covered by the chart, are superimposed on the pronounced
upward trend of this series. These movements consist of accelerated
growth in commercial paper outstanding in recessions, followed by
absolute declines early in expansions and moderate growth later in
expansions. The timing relations are somewhat irregular; and, in view
of the small number of cycle phases involved, it is not clear whether a
normal cyclical pattern exists. In 1953, the period of accelerated growth
in outstandings was very brief, occurring at the outset of the recession;
in 1957, this phase began in the fourth month of the recession and lasted
half a year; in 1960, it began in January, five months ahead of the first
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CHART13
Total Commercial Paper Outstanding, Federal Reserve Series, and
Direct Paper as Percentage of Total, January 1953—October 1961
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Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions.
Source: Data for total commercial paper outstanding are from Appendix A. Dealer paper
and direct paper were separately adjusted for seasonal variation, and the two adjusted series
were then summed. Direct paper as a percentage of total paper is the ratio of the unadjusted
direct paper series to the sum of unadjusted direct and dealer paper.
recessionmonth, and continued for a full year. The amplitudes also
differ, the amount of increase in outstandings being substantial in 1957-
58 and 1960butonly modest in 1953. Similar comments are in order for
the phase of declining outs'tandings and the phase of moderate growth.
In 1954, the decline was scarcely perceptible and terminated soon after
the 1955-57 expansion began. In the two more recent recessions, on the
other hand, the abso'ute declines were sizable, and they continued for
nearly a year, well into the succeeding business expansions.
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The upper line in Chart 13 shows another facet of the cyclical
behavior of commercial paper. During each of the last three recessions
direct paper has declined sharply as a percentage of total outstandings.
In 1957, the fraction in direct paper reached a peak at the business cycle
peak; the fraction in direct paper led the cycle by one month in 1953
and by five months in 1960. In each instance this variable registered a
trough four to seven months after the new business expansion had gotten
under way. The rises in direct paper as a percentage of total outstandings
that have occurred during business expansions have been roughly com-
mensurate with the declines just noted; as a there has. been little
if any trend in the relative importance of the direct market since 1953.
Chart 14 shows dollar values of each of the two components of
commercial paper outstanding, together with differentials between the
prime bank rate on business loans and yields offered on paper. It can
be seen that the cyclical oscillations in the ratio of direct to total paper
reflect widely different behavior patterns in the component series. Dealer
paper shows a strong upsurge during business contractions, then recedes
at a moderate rate throughout business expansions. Like dealer paper,
direct paper typically grows rapidly during the first four to six months
of contractions; but unlike dealer paper, it falls sharply during the
remainder of the contraction and for several months of the succeeding
expansion; it then rises until midway in the next business contraction.
The cyclical turning points of direct paper outstanding lead those of
dealer paper by six to twelve months at peaks and by even longer
intervals at troughs.
Cyclical Changes in Demand and Supply
SIMPLE SUPPLY HYPOTHESIS
In part these cycles in outstanding paper are the result of cost changes,
reflecting cyclical shifts in the supply of funds. it is known, from Table
14 and Chart 14, that commercial paper becomes relatively much
cheaper during recessions, as paper yields fall more than bank rates;
and it is reasonable to suppose that many potential paper borrowers
shift away from bank loans and into paper on these occasions. The
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CHART14
Direct and Dealer Paper Outstanding and Difference Between
Bank Prime Interest Rate and Commercial Paper Yields,
January 1953—October 1961
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Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions.
Source: Direct and deoler paper outstanding are from Appendix A; data are adjusted
for seasonal variation. Rate differentials: bank prime interest rate from Wall Street Journal;
direct paper yields and dealer paper yields are same as in Chart 12.
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behavior of total paper outstanding is consistent with this view (Chart
13), and it is clear from Chart 14 that dealer paper outstanding is closely
associated with rate differentials.
However, the relation breaks down for direct paper, despite a
highly similar pattern of cost changes. During the 1953-57 peak-to-peak
business cycle, direct paper outstanding moved inversely with the rate
differentials: when paper became cheaper, less was borrowed, and vice
versa. Since 1957 the two series have at times moved together, at times
inversely, but it is abundantly clear that cost effects cannot account for
much of the cyclical pattern in direct paper outstanding.
It seems likely, therefore, that the simple supply hypothesis accounts
for cyclical shifts in the relative cost of commercial paper, but that these
cyclical shifts in cost only partially explain the behavior of outstandings
during business cycles.
DIFFERENTIAL SUPPLY HYPOTHESIS
There are other possible explanations from the supply side. Conceivably,
the differences in behavior of the dealer and direct paper markets
reflect differential supply behavior over the cycle—a distinct possibility,
since the groups holding the two types of paper are not entirely the
same. This is particularly plausible when one considers that banks are
major holders of dealer paper, and that dealer paper outstanding in-
creases in recessions, when bank loans are falling, and tends to fall
during expansions, when bank loans are rising. Furthermore, on this
interpretation one would expect the differential between dealer paper
yields and direct paper yields to shrink during periods of expanding
dealer paper and to grow during opposite periods. From Chart 12 it can
be seen that the expected changes in these differentials did tend to occur
during 1958-56 and (in lesser degree) in 1959-60. However, they did
not occur during 1957-58. Furthermore, countercyclical supply changes
in the dealer market can hardly account for the cyclical changes in
direct paper outstanding. It is highly probable that the direct market
also experiences an easing of supply during recessions, though the
degree of easing is undoubtedly less than in the dealer market; yet
direct paper outstanding falls during such periods. It may be concluded
that this differential supply hypothesis explains part, but by no means
all, of the differences in cyclical behavior of the two divisions of the
commercial paper market.
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DIFFERENTIAL DEMAND HYPOTHESIS
From the foregoing it is clear that one must turn to the demand side of
the market to explain completely the behavior of commercial paper
during business cycles. It also seems highly likely that there are dif-
ferences in the cyclical behavior of the demand for funds in the two
segments of the paper market.
According to the differential demand hypothesis, the demand for
funds in the direct market falls so sharply midway during recessions
that outstanding direct paper declines despite substantially eased supply
conditions. Early in business expansions demand recovers sufficiently
to induce a rise in outs tandings despite a tightening of supply conditions;
and supply changes exert the dominant influence in the direct paper
market only briefly, at the outset of recessions. This hypothesis also
asserts that the dealer market is much less subject to these cyclical shifts
in demand.
If the level of receivables of finance companies is taken as an index
of their demand for short-term funds, it should be found, if the differ-
ential demand hypothesis is valid, that receivables of firms that borrow
through dealers are considerably more stable during business cycles
than receivables of direct borrowers. Data are lacking for some firms
in both segments of the market, but several pieces of evidence are
available that are consistent with this hypothesis. First, there is a strong
relationship between direct paper outstanding and total sales finance
company credit, as can be seen in Chart 15. The turning points in the
two series coincide closely in every instance. Even the hesitation in the
growth of receivables late in 1959 has its counterpart in the commercial
paper series. Second, cyclical movements in consumer instalment re-
ceivables of consumer finance companies are extremely mild, whereas
for sales finance companies these movements are pronounced (Chart
15). The cyclical volatility of total sales finance company credit (includ..
ing business credit as well) is even greater. Consumer finance companies,
of course, borrow only through dealers; most sales finance companies
also borrow through dealers, but the largest companies, which account
for the bulk of sales finance and commercial paper out-
standing, borrow directly.
Third, from the NBER sample there are data for fifteen personal
loan company paper borrowers in 1952, 1953, and 1954, and for eighteen
such companies in 1956, 1957, and 1958. The year-end paper outstand-
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CHART15
Outstanding Credit Held by Sales and Consumer Finance Companies
and Direct Paper Outstanding, January 1953—December 1961
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NOTESTO CHART 15
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions.
Source: Directly placed commercial paper outstanding is from Appendix A. All other data
are from FRB monthly releases on 5ales and consumer finance companies. Personal loans held
by sales finance companies are not included.
ingsof these companies have the same cyclical patterns as the monthly
Federal Reserve dealer paper series during these years; and, what is
more important, their receivables (as well as their outstanding com-
mercial paper) increased during both recessions.1 Fourth, among sales
finance companies only, the large direct borrowers in the NBER sample
experienced declining receivables late in both recessions (see Table 15).
Receivables of the smaller firms, on the other hand, rose in 1954 and
fell proportionately less in 1958 than those of the direct borrowers (by
7.7 per cent and 12.7 per cent, respectively). This is what one would
expect, since personal loans, which are cyclically stable, are less im-
portant for direct borrowers as a group than for the rest of the sales
finance industry. Several direct sellers, including General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, have no personal. loans at all.
Finally, the yield differentials shown in Chart 12 behave, on the
whole, as predicted by the differential demand hypothesis. Other things
(principally the supply conditions in the two segments of the market)
remaining the same, differential movements in the demand for funds
will result in variations in the spreads among yields on dealer paper,
direct paper, and Treasury bills.2 In particular, a decline in the demand
for direct paper funds at a time of steady or increasing demand for
dealer paper funds will result in a widening spread between dealer yields
and direct yields, and in a narrowing spread between direct yields
and bill yields. In fact,asI showed earlier, the ceteris pan bus
assumption does not hold; if the dealer market experiences a relatively
greater easing of supply at the same time that the direct market experi-
ences a relatively .greater slackening of demand, the predicted change
iDuring 1952-54 the figures for commercial paper were $49 million, $38 million,
and $64 million; for gross receivables, $1,036 million, $1,152 million, and $1,217
million. The corresponding figures for 1956-58 were $46 million, $61 million, and
$83 million and $1,804 million, $2,035 million, and $2,120 million.
2 assumes that the supply schedules of funds to these markets are not
perfectly elastic with respect to yield.
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TABLE15
SELECTEDBALANCE SHEET ITEMS OF SALES FINANCE COMPANY
BORROWERS OF COMMERCIAL PAPER 1952-54AND1956-58
(milliondollars)
1952 1953 1954 1956 1957 1958
Firms that borrowdirectly a
Commercial paper
outstanding 1,199 1,347 1,097 1,710 2,097 1,706
Bank loans 845 561 551 1,227 1,194 655
Long-term debt 949 1,972 2,046 3,770 3,983 3,961





outstanding 50 46 76 33 29 60
Bank loans 355 366 350 318 360 268
Long-term debt 88 135 147 172 188 206
Gross receivables 571 633 674 819 875 623
SouRcE: NBER finance-company sample; data are for end of company fiscal
years.
aFor 1952-54, four very large sales finance companies that borrowed directly
throughout the period; for 1956-58, one large and five very large sales finance
companies that borrowed directly throughout the period.
bIncludesonly consumer and wholesale receivables.
cFor 1952-54, five small, ten medium, five large, and one very large sales
finance companies that borrowed through dealers throughout the period; for 1956-58,
four small, twelve, medium, and five large sales finance companies that borrowed
through dealers throughout the period.
in spreads between dealer yields and direct yields may not materialize.
Nevertheless, on several occasions—most notably, late in 1953—the
spread between dealer yields and direct yields widened appreciably at
a time when direct outstandings were falling.
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The spread between direct yields and bill yields has also behaved
much as predicted (Chart 12). It rose sharply late in 1953, when direct
paper outstanding also rose sharply; fell in 1954, when direct outstand-
ings fell; rose again in 1955 and early 1956, as outstandings grew rapidly;
then fell in the remainder of 1956 and the first half of 1957, as the growth
in outstandings slackened; rose sharply late in 1957 and early in 1958,
as outstandings spurted upward again; fell to sizable negative values
by late 1958, as outstandings fell; recovered in the first half of 1959, as
outs tandings began to snap back; and fell during the 1960-61 recession,
as outstandings again declined.3
The conclusion seems well established, therefore, that differential
behavior in the demand for funds goes a long way toward explaining
the different cyclical patterns in the two segments of the commercial
paper market.
DIFFEBENTIAL DEMAND ELASTICITY HYPOTHESIS
Unfortunately, some difficulties remain. The picture I have drawn so
far cannot account for the behavior of certain business finance companies
and smaller sales finance companies that sharply increased their paper
borrowing in recessions despite sharp declines in receivables. The expla-
nation of these cases seems to be that demand elasticities, though high for
all borrowers, are considerably higher for some than for others. In
other words, while some borrowers proceed rather cautiously, others
do not hesitate to switch from bank loans to paper when paper funds
become slightly cheaper relative to bank funds.
In part, such differences among borrowers may simply reflect
personality differences among officials responsible for financial policy.
However, the data in Table 15 suggest an additional consideration. Sales
finance companies that use the dealer market rely heavily on banks for
short-term funds, while those that sell paper directly rely much less on
31t should be noted that during the 1959 steel strike direct yields were again
below bill yields for a brief interval, even though direct outstandings continued to
rise with only a momentary hesitation. This apparent discrepancy in the general
relationship described in the text can readily be explained, however. The yield series
shown in Chart 12 is that of a single leading direct borrower whose receivables
consist largely of automobile paper. This firm's paper outstandings did decline late
in 1959 during the period of negative yield spreads. Other direct borrowers, on the
other hand, who were relatively unaffected by the strike, maintained their paper
yields and expanded their paper outstandings at this time. Thus, the "exception"
only proves the rule.
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the banks. As a result, switches from bank loans to paper have relatively
little effect on total bank debt of the smaller borrowers, but a very
substantial effect on bank debt of the direct borrowers. It is reasonable
to suppose, therefore, that dealer market borrowers on the whole
encounter less resistance to repayment of bank debt than do the large
direct borrowers.
SUMMARY
A marked difference in the behavior of direct paper and dealer paper
during recent business cycles has been noted. While direct paper out-
standing has increased and decreased with business expansions and
contractions, dealer paper has tended to move in a countercyclical
fashion. These movements can be explained by the following four
propositions. During recessions there is:
1. A general increase in the supply of funds to the money market and
to both divisions of the commercial paper market.
2. A relatively greater easing of supply in the dealer paper market.
3. A decline in the demand for funds in the direct paper market and
a relatively stable demand for funds in the dealer market.
4. A higher elasticity of demand for paper funds by some business
finance companies and smaller sales finance companies than by
the large direct borrowers.
Changes opposite to those described under (1) to (3) take place during
business cycle expansions.
These propositions are consistent with the observed pattern of
change of finance-company receivables and with the behavior of the
relative cost of paper funds. Furthermore, their implications with respect
to the differentials between bill yields and direct yields and between
direct yields and dealer paper yields are also generally in accord
with fact.
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